

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 03874 01 OF 04 231714Z

53

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00

ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02

OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15

TRSE-00 NSC-05 INRE-00 ERDE-00 EB-07 /089 W

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 USNATO 3874

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJECT: MBFR: SERVICE SUB-CEILINGS WITHIN A COMBINED AIR/GROUND
COMMON CEILING

REF: A. USNATO 3781 DTG 161551Z JUL 75

B. USNATO 3695 DTG 111007Z JUL 75

C. USNATO 3493 DTG 281250Z JUL 75

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS THE REVISED DRAFT MBFR WORKING GROUP REPORT
ON SUB-CEILINGS WITHIN A COMINED AIR/GROUND COMMON CEILING (PARA 10,
REF A). ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON GUIDANCE ON THIS REPORT PRIOR
TO JULY 29 WG MEETING, PER PARA 12, REF A, AND IN LIGHT OF MISSION
COMMENTS PARA 9-10, REF B, AND FINAL SUB-PARA 9 OF REF C.

2. BEGIN TEXT

SUBJECT: SUB-CEILINGS WITIN A COMBINED AIR/GROUND
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 03874 01 OF 04 231714Z

COMMON CEILING

THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS AN INTIAL MBFR WORKING GROUP DRAFT
REPORT ON THE ABOVE SUBJECT. IT REFLECTS THE COMMENTS

AND SUGGESTIONS OF THE WORKING GROUP AT THEIR MEETING ON 15 JULY 1975. THIS DRAFT WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE AGENDA FOR THE WORKING GROUP MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 29 JULY 1975.

1. AT THEIR MEETING ON FRIDAY, 18 JULY, 1975, THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL INVITED THE MBFR WORKING GROUP TO COMPLETE THEIR STUDY OF THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF A COMBINED GROUND/AIR COMMON CEILING. THE PROBLEMS REMAINING TO BE RESOLVED IN THE WORKING GROUP CONCERN POSSIBLE MEANS OF ALLOWING SOME (LIMITED) FREEDOM TO TRANSFER BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER POST-MBFR.

2. POSSIBLE METHODS SUGGESTED THUS FAR ARE EXAMINED AT ANNEX. THE BASIC ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED ARE:

A. THE NEED TO RETAIN THE ALLIED FOCUS ON GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS AND, POST-MBFR, TO ACHIEVE, AND MAINTAIN, APPROXIMATE PARITY IN EAST/WEST GROUND MANPOWER.

B. THE DESIRABILITY OF ALLOWING, POST-MBFR, SOME FREEDOM TO INCREASE GROUND FORCES AT THE EXPENSE OF AIR, OR VICE VERSA.

3. THE TWO OBJECTIVES AT PARA 2, ASSUMING RECIPROCAL APPLICATION OF 2B. ARE, PRIMA FACIE, IN CONTRADICTION. UNDER ANY CONCEIVABLE SYSTEM WHICH ALLOWED FREEDOM TO INCREASE GROUND FORCES AT THE EXPENSE OF AIR FORCES, THE WARSAW PACT WOULD BE ABLE TO REINSTATE AT LEAST SOME OF THE GROUND FORCES REDUCED/WITHDRAWN UNDER AN MBFR AGREEMENT: AND, DEPENDING ON THE NUMBERS INVOLVED, THIS COULD OPERATE TO FRUSTRATE THE ALLIED OBJECTIVE OF APPROXIMATE PAIRTY IN GROUND FORCES.

4. ON THE OTHER HAND, A FIXED GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL CEILING (WHETHER WITHIN A COMBINED GROUND/AIR COMMON CEILING OR IN ISOLATION) WOULD TEND TO LOCK ALLIED FORCES INTO THE PRESENT ALLOCATION OF MANPOWER RESOURCES BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORDES. THIS WOULD APPLY TO THE AGGREGATE GROUND/AIR ALLIED MANPOWER: AND WOULD HAVE A SIMILAR INHIBITING EFFECT ON NATIONAL GROUND/AIR
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 03874 01 OF 04 231714Z

ELEMENTS CONTRBUTING TO THAT AGGREGATE. THERE WOULD BE NO INHIBITION ON RESTRUCTURING TO IMPROVE UTILISATION OF MANPOWER WITHIN GROUND OR WITHIN AIR FORCES: THERE WOULD BE AN INHIBITION ON TRANSFERES FROM AIR TO GROUND.

5. THE EFFECTS OF SUCH RIGIDITY ARE DIFFICULT TO FORECAST. THERE ARE NO KNOWN NATIONAL PLANS TO INCREASE GROUND OR AIR MANPOWER, EXCEPT FOR A UK REQUIREMENT TO AUGMENT THE RAF AIR ELEMENTS IN THE NGA BY SOME 600 MEN. THAT INCREASE COULD BE CONTAINED WITHIN A NON-INCREASE AGREEMENT FOR AGGREGATE AIR MANPOWER AT PRESENT LEVELS OR IN A CEILING AT THOSE LEVELS.

6. SIMILARILY, THERE ARE NO KNOW FIRM FORWARD REQUIREMENTN

POST-MBFR, TO TRANSFER SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF MEN BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES.

7. IT IS ENVISAGED HOWEVEF THAT, WITH IMPROVEMENT AND TECHNICAL ADVANCE (CURRENT AND FORECAST) OF SSM LAUNCHING SYSTEMS AND WARHEADS, THERE IS LIKELY TO BE A TREND TOWARDS ENHANCEMENT OF CAPABILITY OF SSM SYSTEMS, WHICH COULD ENTAIL SOME ADJUSTMENT IN AIRCRAFT TASKING. THE EFFECTS OF THIS, IN TERMS OF MANPOWER, CANNOT BE FORECAST. THE US FORCES IN THE NGA ARE MOST LIKELY TO BE FIRST TO BE INFLUENCED. FURTHERMORE, THE ECONOMIC PRESSURES OF NATIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE TEND TO STIMULATE SCHEMES FOR RATIONALISATION WHICH ENTAIL ONE SERVICE UNDERTAKING SPECIFIED TASKS FOR ALL THREE: SUCH SCHEMES COULD INVOLVE THE INCREASE OF ONE SERVICE AND THE REDUCTION OF ANOTHER.

8. THE ADVANTAGE OF RETAINING THE CAPABILITY TO EFFECT SUCH CHANGES COULD BE SUBSTANTIAL.

9. THE PROBLEM, THEREFORE, IS TO FIND A METHOD OF ACHIEVING SUCH FLEXIBILITY, WITHOUT ERODING THE ALLIED FOCUS ON REDUCTIONS IN AN APPROXIMATE PARITY OF GROUND FORCES. THE PAPER AT ANNEX EXAMINES THREE POSSIBLE MEANS OF DOING THIS, ALL OF WHICH PROVIDE LIMITED FREEDOM TO MIX GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER, WITHIN AN OVERALL GROUND/AIR COMMON CEILING, POST-MBFR.

10. ANY ONE OF THE THREE METHODS COULD BE SO DEFINED THAT THE SCALE OF INCREASE OF GROUND FORCES PERMITTED TO THE WP POST-MBFR, COULD BE CONSTRAINED TO THE EXTENT NECESSARY TO ENSURE
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 03874 01 OF 04 231714Z

THAT THE ALLIED FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES IS NOT ERODED. IN EACH CASE, THIS WOULD ENTAIL DETERMINATION OF, AND AGREEMENT, ON THE AMOUNT OF FLEXIBILITY PERMITTED. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY FIRM FORECAST OF ALLIED REQUIREMENTS TO INCREASE GROUND FORCES AT THE EXPENSE OF AIR, A PRIMARY FACTOR DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF FLEXIBILITY DESIRABLE MUST BE THE AMOUNT WHICH, PERMITTED TO THE EAST, WOULD STILL ENABLE ALLIED OBJECTIVES TO BE MAINTAINED.

THAT AMOUNT CAN ONLY BE FINALLY DETERMINED WHEN THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE SUFFICIENTLY ADVANCED TO PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL INDICATIONS OF THE LIKELY POST-MBFR GROUND FORCE LEVELS. IT IS UNLIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT THE ALLIES WOULD FIND IT TOLERABLE TO ALLOW THE EAST FREEDOM TO INCREASE THE POST-MBFR GROUND FORCE LEVELS BY MORE THAN (SAY) 30,000.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 03874 02 OF 04 231727Z

53

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 4 USNATO 3874

ANNEX

INTRODUCTION

1. THE MBFR WORKING GROUP HAVE PREVIOUSLY EXAMINED THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF POSSIBLE APPROACHES FOR THE INCLUSINON OF AIR MANPOWER IN A COMMON CEILING WITHOUT ADDRESSING AIR MANPOWER FOR REDUCTIONS(1). IN THAT EXAMINATION, FOUR POSSIBLE APPROACHES WHICH EMBRACE AIR AND GROUND MANPOWER IN A COMMON CEILING WERE ENVISAGED,AND WHICH VARY ONLY AS TO THE SPECIFICATION OF AGGGREGATE SERVICE SUB-CEILINGS, IF ANY. THOSE APPROACHES ARE:

A. APPORACH1: SPECIFIES NO SERVICE SUB-CEILINGS.

B. APPROACH2: SPECIFIES SUB-CEILINGS ON AIR AND GROND MANPOWER.

C. APPROACH 3: SPECIFIES A SUB-CEILING ON GROUND MANPOWER ONLY.

D. APPROACH4: SPECIFIES A SUB-CEILING ON AIR MANPOWER ONLY.

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 03874 02 OF 04 231727Z

2. THIS WG REPORT (1) EXAMINED, INTER ALIA, THE IMPLICATIONS OF THESE FOUR APPRACHES FOR ALIED FORCE RESTRUCTURING AND MAINTENANCE OF THE ALLIED FOCUS ON GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS. ALTHOUGH NOT SO EXPLICITLY STATED, THE REPORT SHOWS THAT:

A. APPROACH 1 WOULD PROVIDE MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY TO BOTH SIDES IN RESTRUCTURING THEIR FORCES UNDER A COMBINED AIR/GROUND COMMON CEILING; HOWEVER, IT WOULD FAIL TO MEET THE ALLIED OBJECTIVE OF

MAINTAINING THE FOCUS ON GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS.

B. APPROACH 2 WOULD PRECLUDE ANY FLEXIBILITY IN THE RESTRUCTURING OF FORCES, BUT WOULD MAINTAIN THE FOCUS ON GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS.

(1) AC/276/D(74)14

C. APPROACH 3 WOULD PROVIDE SOME FLEXIBILITY IN RESTRUCTURING FORCES BY PERMITTING AIR MANPOWER IN THE NGA TO BE INCREASED AT THE EXPENSE OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND WOULD MAINTAIN THE FOCUS ON GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS.

D. APPROACH 4 WOULD PROVIDE SOME FLEXIBILITY IN RESTRUCTURING FORCES BY PERMITTING GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE NGA TO BE INCREASED AT THE EXPENSE OF AIR MANPOWER, BUT WOULD FAIL TO MAINTAIN THE FOCUS ON GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS.

3. THUS, EACH OF THE FOUR APPROACHES FAILS, IN SOME RESPECT, TO MEET COMPLETELY BOTH THE REQUIREMENT TO RETAIN FLEXIBILITY IN RESTRUCTURING FORCES AND TO MAINTAIN THE FOCUS ON GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS. TO OVERCOME THESE FAILINGS, AN "IDEAL" APPROACH, FROM THE ALLIED MILITARY VIEWPOINT, WOULD BE ONE WHICH PERMITS MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY IN THE RESTRUCTURING OF NATO FORCES WHILE CONSTRAINING WP FORCES FROM SUCH RESTRUCTURING, PARTICULARLY IN RESPECT OF AN INCREASE IN WP GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. BUT IT WOULD BE UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THE EAST TO AGREE ANY SUCH "IDEAL" APPROACH. ANY MEASURES

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 03874 02 OF 04 231727Z

OR APPROACHES WHICH ARE IMPOSED TO PREVENT CIRCUMVENTION OF REDUCTIONS WILL HAVE TO APPLY AS MUCH TO NATO FORCES REDUCED OR WITHDRAWN FROM THE NGA AS TO WP FORCES. THE ONLY IDENTIFIABLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE "IDEAL", THEN, ARE THOSE APPROACHES WHICH, WHEN APPLIED TO BOTH NATO AND WP FORCES IN THE NGA, WOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE ALLIED OBJECTIVE TO MAINTAIN THE FOCUS ON GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS AND YET NOT UNDULY CONSTRAIN FORCE RESTRUCTURING: APPROACHES SOMETHING LESS THAN THE "IDEAL", BUT ONES WHICH OVERCOME THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE FOUR APPROACHES ALREADY EXAMINED BY THE WORKING GROUP.

4. TO DATE, THE WORKING GROUP HAVE IDENTIFIED THREE SUCH ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES. EACH OF THESE APPROACHES FALLS INTO THE "LIMITED FREEDOM-TO-MIX" CATEGORY, A CATEGORY FIRST SUGGESTED BY THE US IN THE PAPER ON THE "ROLE OF AIR MANPOWER IN MBFR"(1). THESE ALTERNATIVES PROVIDE, TO VARYING DEGREES, LIMITED FLEXIBILITY IN FORCE RESTRUCTURING AND TO VARYING DEGREES, MAINTENANCE OF THE FOCUS ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS PAPER THESE ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES ARE IDENTIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

- A. NON-EXPLICIT SUB-CEILINGS.
- B. FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE FOR SUB-CEILINGS.
- C. OVERLAPPING SUB-CEILINGS.

PURPOSE

5. THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER IS TO COMPLETE, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, THE WORKING GROUP'S EXAMINATION OF THE POSSIBLE APPROACHES FOR THE INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN A COMMON CEILING WITHOUT ADDRESSING AIR MANPOWER FOR REDUCTIONS BY EXAMINING THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE THREE ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES ON SERVICES SUB-CEILINGS IDENTIFIABLE IN PARA 4 ABOVE.

NON-EXPLICIT SUB-CEILINGS

6. UNDER THIS APPROACH, AN MBFR AGREEMENT WOULD NOT ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF SERVICE SUB-CEILINGS IN AN EXPLICIT NUMERIC NUMBER (1). IN THIS RESPECT, IT IS THE SAME AS APPROACH 1 (WHICH SPECIFIES NO SERVICE SUB-CEILINGS). IT DIFFERS FROM APPROACH 1, HOWEVER, IN THAT THE DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY TO RESTRUCTURE FORCES IN A POST-REDUCTION ENVIRONMENT (WHICH IS UNLIMITED UNDER APPROACH 1) WOULD BE LIMITED BY
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 03874 02 OF 04 231727Z

THE INCLUSION OF A PROVISION IN THE MBFR AGREEMENT, WHICH THE US HAS SUGGESTED(2) MIGHT BE:

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- (1) USNATO/POL/OUT/NS/74-154 OF 2 DEC 75
 - (2) USNATO/POL/OUT/NS/75-5
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"NEITHER SIDE WILL RESTRUCTURE FORCES BETWEEN SERVICES IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ALTER SIGNIFICANTLY THE SERVICE MANPOWER RELATIONSHIPS (RATIO) EXISTING AFTER THE REDUCTIONS OR TO CIRCUMVENT THE NATURE OF THE REDUCTIONS."

7. UNDER SUCH A PROVISION, THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE RATION OF AIR TO GROUND FORCE MANPOWER COULD BE ALTERED IN A POST-REDUCTION ENVIRONMENT BEFORE THE ALTERATION BECOMES "SIGNIFICANT" IS UNCLEAR. IT IS CLEAR THAT SOME DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY TO RESTRUCTURE FORCES IS PERMISSIBLE, BUT THAT DEGREE IS LIMITED NOT ONLY BY THE WORD "SIGNIFICANTLY", BUT ALSO BY THE PHRASE "OR TO CIRCUMVENT THE NATURE OF REDUCTIONS."

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 03874 03 OF 04 231737Z

53
ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00

ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 4 USNATO 3874

FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE FOR SUB-CEILINGS(1)

8. IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED THAT ONE WAY TO DEFINE THE DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY TO RESTRUCTURE FORCES WOULD BE TO PERMIT A RANGE OF NUMERICAL SUB-CEILINGS ON GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER (ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARILY EXPRESSED IN THOSE TERMS IN AN MBFR AGREEMENT) WHICH COULD VARY FROM THE GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER LEVELS REMAINING IN THE NGA AFTER REDUCTIONS (POST-PHASE II) BY ANY AMOUNT UP TO AN AGREED MAXIMUM, I.E. THE "FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE", BEARING IN MIND THAT IF THE MANPOWER OF ONE FORCE IS INCREASED BY ANY AMOUNT UP TO THE AGREED MAXIMUM, THE MANPOWER OF THE OTHER FORCE MUST BE DECREASED A LIKE AMOUNT SO THAT THE RESULTING TOTAL OF GROUND PLUS AIR MANPOWER DOES NOT EXCEED THE AGREED COMBINED GROUND AIR MANPOWER CEILING.

(1) THE MBFR WG HAVE PREVIOUSLY EXAMINED THIS APPROACH, IN SOME DETAIL,

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 03874 03 OF 04 231737Z

IN THE CONTEXT OF A COMBINED AIR/GROUND COMMON CEILING WITH
OPTIONAL AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN AC/276-D(75)5

9. UNLESS PROHIBITED IN SOME WAY BY THE PROVISIONS OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT, EACH SIDE COULD DECIDE WHEN AND IF TO USE THIS ALLOWANCE. AT ANY GIVEN POINT, THEN, POST-PHASE II RESIDUAL MANPOWER LEVELS IN THE NGA COULD REMAIN UNCHANGED OR CHANGE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING NINE SCENARIOS:

	NATO		WP	
	GROUND	AIR	GROUND	AIR
	M'POWER	M'POWER	M'POWER	M'POWER
SCENARIO NO.	LEVEL	LEVEL	LEVEL	LEVEL
1.	UNCHANGED	UNCHANGED	UNCHANGED	UNCHANGED
2.	UNCHANGED	UNCHANGED	INCREASED	DECREASED
3.	UNCHANGED	UNCHANGED	DECREASED	INCREASED
4.	INCREASED	DECREASED	UNCHANGED	UNCHANGED
T.	INCREASED	DECREASED	INCREASED	DECREASED
6.	INCREASED	DECREASED	DECREASED	INCREASED
7.	DECREASED	INCREASED	UNCHANGED	UNCHANGED
8.	DECREASED	INCREASED	INCREASED	DECREASED
9.	DECREASED	INCREASED	DECREASED	INCREASED

12. THUS, IF THE COMBINED AIR/GROUND COMMON CEILING WERE SET AT 900,000, IT WOULD BE HYPOTHETICALLY POSSIBLE TO SET THE MAXIMUM NATO GROUND FORCE MANPOWER STRENGTH IN THE NGA, POST-PHASE II, AT SAY 730,000 AND THE MAXIMUM NATO AIR MANPOWER FIGURE AT, SAY, 210,000. HOWEVER, THIS WOULD NOT MEAN THAT POST-PHASE II, COMBINED NATO AIR AND GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE NGA COULD CLIMB TO 940,000. ON THE CONTRATY, IF, FOR EXAMPLE, NATO SHOULD WISH TO INCREASE ITS GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE NGA TO THE SET MAXIMUM TO 170,000, THUS MAINTAINING ITS COMBINED AIR AND MANPOWER STRENGTH AT THE AGREED COMBINED AIR-GROUND COMMON CEILING OF 900,000.

13. THE OVERLAPPING SUB-CEILING APPROACH IS THEREFORE NOTHING MORE THAN THE FLEXIBLE ALLOWANCE APPROACH STATED IN DIFFERENT TERMS. THE EFFECT OF THE OVERLAPPING APPROACH, LIKE THAT OF THE FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE, WOULD BE TO PERMIT A RANGE OF NUMERICAL
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 03874 03 OF 04 231737Z

SUB-CEILINGS ON GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER WHICH COULD VARY FROM THE GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER LEVELS REMAINING IN THE NGA AFTER REDUCTIONS (POST-PHASE II) BY ANY AMOUNT UP TO AN AGREED MAXIMUM. ALSO LIKE THE FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE APPROACH, AT ANY GIVEN TIME, POST-PHASE II, RESIDWDOLMANPOWER LEVELS IN THE NGA COULD REMAIN UNCHANGED OR CHANGE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NINE SCENARIOS SHOWN IN PARA 9 AND THE DISPARITIES BETWEEN NATO AND WP FORCES IN THE NGA WOULD VARY AS THE SCENARIOS CHANGE.

REQUIREMENT FOR FORCE STRUCTURING

14. EXISTING NATO PLANS FOR RATIONALISATION/SPECIALISATION AND OTHERS UNDER CONSIDERATION INVOLVING FORCE STRUCTURES DO NOT CALL FOR INCREASES IN THE OVERALL ALLIANCE AGGREGATE AIR MANNING LEVELS(1) ALL ALLIES, EXCEPT THE UK WHICH FORESEES AN

(1) AC/276-D(74)11

INCREASE OF ABOUT 600 AIR FORCE PERSONNEL IN THE NGA, HAVE

STATED THEY HAVE NO CURRENT PLANS FOR AIR MANPOWER INCREASES(1). OTHER THAN THE UK REQUIREMENT, THERE IS NOT IDENTIFIABLE REQUIREMENT FOR INCREASING NATO AIR FORCES. THE POSSIBILITY THAT ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS WILL EXIST IN THE FUTURE CANNOT BE EXCLUDED.

15. THE WORKING GROUP IS UNAWARE OF ANY ALLIED OR NATIONAL PLANS WHICH MIGHT CALL FOR RESTRUCTURING OF GROUND FORCES - THAT

IS THE INCREASING OF GROUND FORCES AT THE EXPENSE OF AIR FORCES. AS FAR AS FUTURE REQUIREMENTS ARE CONCERNED, THERE ARE INDICATIONS WHICH PLACE SOME DOUBT ON WHETHER A REQUIREMENT FOR RESTRUCTURING WILL DEVELOP. ON THE ONE HAND, THE TREND IN NATO IS TO DECREASE GROUND FORCES BY REDUCING GROUND SUPPORT PERSONNEL AND BY INTRODUCING NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS THAT REQUIRE LESS, RATHER THAN MORE, GROUND FORCE MANPOWER TO SUPPORT THEM THAN THE SYSTEMS REPLACED. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT FUTURE RATIONALISATION PLANS COULD CALL FOR THE TRANSFER OF CERTAIN FUNCTIONS FROM THE AIR TO GROUND FORCES (E.G. ALL MEDICAL SERVICES TO THE ARMY)

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 03874 04 OF 04 231744Z

53

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00

ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02

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S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 4 USNATO 3874

16. FOR THE SHORT TERM, SINCE ALLIED NATIONS HAVE NO CURRENT PLANS TO RESTRUCTURE ONE FORCE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE OTHER, ANY OF THE APPROACHES TO SUB-CEILINGS (APPROACHES 1-4 AND THE THREE ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES) WOULD APPEAR TO MEET CURRENT ALLIED RESTRUCTURING REQUIREMENTS. FOR THE LONG TERM, HOWEVER,

ONLY APPROACH 1 WOULD PERMIT ALL POSSIBLE FUTURE ALLIED RESTRUCTURING REQUIREMENTS TO BE MET. WHETHER THE THREE ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES, WHICH OFFER A LIMITED DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY FOR RESTRUCTURING, COULD PROVIDE THE DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY NEEDED TO MEET FUTURE ALLIED REQUIREMENTS CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED.

FORCE STRUCTURING VS CONSTRAIN ON WP GROUND FORCE LEVELS

17. THE REQUIREMENT TO RETAIN FLEXIBILITY IN RESTRUCTURING FORCES IS, TO A LARGE EXTENT, INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE REQUIREMENT TO CONSTRAIN WP RESIDUAL GROUND FORCE LEVELS, POST-PHASE II: A REQUIREMENT WHICH IS INHERENT IN THE ALLIED OBJECTIVE OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN NATO AND WP GROUND FORCES IN THE NGA. THE DEGREE OF
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 03874 04 OF 04 231744Z

FLEXIBILITY TO RESTRUCTURE FORCES PERMITTED UNDER ANY APPROACH TO THE SUB-CEILING ISSUE CANNOT BE SO LARGE THAT, IF APPLIED BY EITHER SIDE TO POST PHASE II RESIDUAL MANPOWER LEVELS, THE RESULTING NATO AND WP GROUND MANPOWER LEVELS CAN NO LONGER BE REGARDED MILITARILY AS CONSTITUTING APPROXIMATE PARITY.

18. TO DATE, NO JUDGEMENT HAS BEEN MADE BY THE ALLIANCE AS TO HOW LARGE THE DISPARITY IN NATO AND WP RESIDUAL GROUND FORCE LEVELS, POST-PHASE II, COULD BECOME BEFORE SUCH DISPARITY COULD NO LONGER BE REGARDED AS MEETING THE ALLIED OBJECTIVE OF APPROXIMATE PARITY FOR GROUND FORCES. IF AND WHEN SUCH A JUDGEMENT IS MADE AND EXPRESSED IN TERMS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE DISPARITY BETWEEN NATO AND WP GROUND MANPOWER LEVELS MUST NOT EXCEED A GIVEN AMOUNT OR A CERTAIN PERCENTAGE OF AN AGREED COMMON CEILING FIGURE, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MORE NARROWLY DEFINE "SIGNIFICANTLY" UNDER THE NON-SPECIFIC SUB-CEILING APPROACH, TO CALCULATE AN ALLOWANCE FIGURE UNDER THE FLEXIBILITY ALLOWANCE APPROACH, AND TO SET A MAXIMUM FIGURE FOR SUB-CEILING UNDER THE OVERLAPPING CEILINGS APPROACH.

IT WOULD ALSO THEN BE POSSIBLE TO SUBJECTIVELY ASSESS TO WHAT EXTENT SUCH AN AMOUNT IS LIKELY TO MEET PLANNED OR FUTURE ALLIED FORCE RESTRUCTURING REQUIREMENTS.

19. ALTHOUGH RECOGNISING THE DESIRABILITY OF RETAINING AS MUCH FLEXIBILITY AS POSSIBLE FOR FORCE RESTRUCTURING, POST-PHASE II, THE MBFR WORKING GROUP TAKE THE VIEW THAT IT WOULD NOT BE IN THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF NATO TO PREJUDICE THE ACHIEVEMENT OR MAINTENANCE OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN NATO AND WP GROUND FORCES FOR THE SAKE OF RETAINING FLEXIBILITY TO RESTRUCTURE FORCES, EVEN IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO ACCURATELY PREDICT FUTURE NATO REQUIREMENTS. THIS IS IN LINE WITH A PREVIOUS WORKING GROUP FINDING (1) THAT "AN AGREEMENT IN RESPECT OF A CEILING INCLUDING AIR MANPOWER SHOULD BE SO FORMULATED THAT IT WOULD NOT PREJUDICE, OR ALLOW CONTRAVENTION OF NATO OBJECTIVES WITH RESPECT TO GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS".

MILITARY SECURITY EFFECTS

20. THE MBFR WG HAVE PREVIOUSLY FOUND (1) THAT APPROACHES 2-3
HAVE NO ADVERSE MILITARY SECURITY EFFECTS FOR NATO AND THAT APP-
ROACHES 1 AND 4 MIGHT NOT BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE ALLIED FOCUS ON
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 03874 04 OF 04 231744Z

ACHIEVEMENT OF ASYMMETRIC REDUCTIONS IN GROUND FORCES LEADING
TO A COMMON CEILING IN THE NGA, SINCE THEY WOULD NOT PRECLUDE
REINSTATEMENT OF GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS AT THE EXPENSE OF AIR.
WHETHER THE THREE ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES WOULD HAVE NO ADVERSE
SECURITY EFFECTS FOR NATO WOULD DEPEND UPON THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL
THAT EITHER SIDE COULD TRANSFER FROM ONE SERVICE TO ANOTHER
TO MEET RESTRUCTURING REQUIREMENTS AND WHETHER THE NUMBER IS
COMPATIBLE WITH THE REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN APPROXIMATE PARITY OF
GROUND FORCES IN THE NGA.

(1) AC/276-D(74)14

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Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
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Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: A. USNATO 3781 DTG 161551Z JUL 75 B. USNATO 3695 DTG 111007Z JUL 75 C. USNATO 3493 DTG 281250Z JUL 75
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 03 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <03 APR 2003 by Izenbel0>; APPROVED <09 APR 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

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06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: SERVICE SUB-CEILINGS WITHIN A COMBINED AIR/GROUND COMMON CEILING
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO VIENNA
BONN
LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

Type: TE

Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006